1 Introduction

Pains vary in intensity. A good philosophical theory of pain should say something about those variations. For one, variations in the intensity or urgency of pain are, from a practical standpoint, almost as important as the presence or absence of pain itself. An ibuprofen may dull but not eliminate the pain of your sore muscles. That will have consequences for how you feel, what you do, and what your pain is like.

For another, if you don’t say something about degrees of pain, your philosophical opponents will tend to assume that you can’t. We have both recently defended versions of an imperative theory of pain.¹ On such a view, pains have imperative contents that express commands to do or avoid certain actions. For example, in Martínez’s version, the content of pain experiences is analogous to:

See to it that this bodily state does not exist!

That is, a pain is an imperative which would be satisfied if the sufferer of pain ceased to be in a particular bodily state. That bodily state is typically one that’s threatening to life or health. Hence pains typically command us to do things that will keep our bodies intact and well-functioning.

¹See Klein 2007 and Martínez 2010. Richard Hall has also defended an imperative view in his 2008.
Imperative content prescribes some action to be taken, or some goal state to be attained. Pains are not the only sensation with imperative content, and the difference between pain and many other sensations can be explained in terms of the differences in the imperatives that constitute them. Itches command scratching regions rather than protecting them; hunger commands eating rather than actions directed at particular body parts. Finally, imperative modalities differ from representational modalities like vision and touch: the latter represent features of the world and have truth-apt contents, while the former command an action and so do not have truth-apt content.\footnote{Recently, it has been suggested that the content of certain perceptual states might have imperatival aspects—see, e.g., Siegel (forthcoming) on experienced mandates, or Bengson (in progress) on practical perception. Regardless of whether such suggestions are correct, no one denies that much of the content of perceptual experiences is not imperative.}

In defending imperativism, neither of us has said much about intensities of pain. Several authors have recently suggested that this is because there is nothing to be said: imperativism, for principled reasons, cannot give a story about urgency. That would appear to be a point in favor of representationalism about pain. For many facts about the world vary in magnitude, many representations track such variations, and so if pains represent then it is easy to see how they might track something that can vary in magnitude. The imperativist—who does not think that pains track properties in the world—has no corresponding facts to appeal to.

Our opponents are too pessimistic. We think that a perfectly satisfying account of imperative urgency can be given. There are two tasks for us to take care of. First, we must establish the general fact that imperatives can vary in urgency or intensity. We’ll do that in section 2. Along the way, we will respond to several critics of the imperative theory. Second, we must give a model for those variations, on which the variations are part of the content of the imperative. Imperativism is most exciting as an intentionalist theory, on which phenomenal properties supervene on intentional contents; failure to reduce variations in intensity to variations in content would weaken the appeal of imperativism. We give such a model in section 3, and conclude with a few brief reflections on the naturalization of imperative urgency.
2  Imperatives come in Degrees

2.1  Imperative intensity

Commands come in degrees. All things being equal, shouting:

   Pass the salt now!

conveys a more urgent command than does a calm

   Please pass the salt at your earliest convenience!

Variations in imperative intensity have various practical consequences. All things being equal, a more intense imperative should be more likely to make you change your plans, to perform the commanded action sooner, to weight the commanded action higher when deliberating among mutually exclusive courses of action, and so on.

More formally, we will assume that the content of an imperative can be partially identified with a set of satisfaction conditions.\(^3\) “Pass me the salt!” is satisfied just in case you pass me the salt. So the content of the imperative is, at a first pass, the set of worlds in which you pass me the salt. A command from a legitimate source gives you a reason to bring about the satisfaction conditions, and a command you accept as legitimate will have practical consequences for your action.

The urgency of a command is simply a further weighting on the set of satisfaction worlds. So at its most general, the proposal is this: the content of an imperative includes both a set of satisfaction-worlds and a degree of intensity. The intensity might be relatively vague, as in the case of the salt

\(^3\)We assume this without argument; see Hamblin (1987) for some nice ones. We will refine this quick version, but we will not discuss all of the refinements that might be necessary. Vranas in particular has given compelling arguments that imperative content requires both satisfaction and violation conditions, an alternative that we won’t pursue here (2008).
commands above. Or the degree may be more precisely specified, as it is
in certain more formal contexts: triage classifications in emergency rooms,
the rubber stamps used by enthusiastic managers to prioritize their edicts,
or the priority codes on the Autovon telephone network.

The Autovon priority system is an especially nice example of what we have
in mind. The Autovon network was developed during the cold war to pro-
vide communication during a nuclear attack. An Autovon keypad had an
additional column of four keys which allowed the user to specify the prece-
dence level of the call. Higher precedence calls would, if necessary, kick
lower precedence calls off of the trunk to ensure that a call went through.
The highest level, which would guarantee that a call would go through if
any could, was restricted to the White House. A similar, more complex
system is still in place. (Note that the priorities relate to the routing of the
calls, not to the contents of the calls themselves. The White House could
use Autovon to order a pizza: while the call itself would trump all others,
delivery probably wouldn’t be high on anyone’s list during a nuclear war.)

We will argue that imperative intensity can be generally modeled by some-
thing like the Autovon’s ranking system. Before we get there, however, we
want to say a few words about what imperative intensity is not.

2.2 What intensity isn’t

That commands can vary in intensity is, we take it, obvious enough. Further,
the extension to pains seems straightforward enough: pains are imperatives,
like other imperatives they can vary in intensity, and that variation has
exactly the same sorts of practical consequences. A more intense pain in
your foot will, all things being equal, cause you to forgo more activities in
order to tend to your foot, to tend to your foot more urgently, and so forth.

There is still work left to do to ensure that intensity can be usefully modeled.
Before we do it, though, it’s worth distinguishing intensities from a few
things which look a lot like intensity but aren’t. Failure to do so has, we
think, led to some of the objections to the imperative account.

First, the degree of an command ought to be distinguished from the illocu-
tionary force of an utterance of an imperative. Imperatives can be polite
or nasty; they can be phrased as requests or pleas or straightforward commands. None of these are variations in intensity per se, though one often conveys variations in intensity by variations in illocutionary force.

Failure to distinguish the two may lead to the impression that variations in intensity are not part of the content of imperatives. In a recent paper, Cutter and Tye have objected that an appeal to degrees amounts to abandoning intentionalism. Regarding the proposal that imperatives vary in intensity, they write that:

On such a proposal, the difference between [two pains] is analogous to the difference between the following two imperative sentences:

- (Please) stop that bodily disturbance.
- Stop that bodily disturbance!!! (Cutter & Tye 2011)

They then object that such an account is inconsistent with intentionalism because

[N]ow the phenomenal character of an experience does not supervene on its content alone; rather it supervenes on its content together with its degree of urgency. (Cutter & Tye 2011, p. 104)

We agree with Cutter and Tye that the two sentences above may not differ in content. The variations in the two sentences above are variations in politeness, however, not the urgency of the imperative. More generally, two imperatives may differ in illocutionary force without differing in content. The very same command may be ordered, demanded, requested, or politely suggested. Why? Because commands are individuated by their content — on our account, the satisfaction-conditions of the command plus a weight — while differences in illocutionary force depend on the social circumstances under which imperatives are uttered. So the very same command can be conveyed in varying external circumstances, and carrying information relevant to those circumstances and irrelevant to the satisfaction-conditions.

There is the potential for confusion, we suggest, because sometimes urgency can be conveyed by uttering imperatives with the right illocutionary force —
rude commands tend to suggest high urgency, for example, and polite ones low urgency. But note that that’s entirely compatible with urgency being part of the content of the command. Compare: I might convey the relative temperature of a 110-degree day by using a variety of choice expletives. The vigorousness of my swearing might accurately convey the degree to which some external magnitude varies. Yet my claims about the temperature still depends, in an important sense, on what I have said. So too with imperatives.

Second, intensity ought to be distinguished from priority. Some imperatives ought to be satisfied sooner than others. This temporal ordering may depend in part upon the intrinsic content of an imperative. However, priority itself seems like an extrinsic property of imperatives. That urgent bit of dusting becomes less urgent when the house is on fire; the urgent ache in your toe suddenly becomes less so when the bear appears from behind the tree. Of course, priority depends on intensity: all things being equal, a more intense imperative should also be satisfied sooner. But it also depends on what else is going on, and to which other imperatives you’re subject. So while imperative priority is tightly related to intensity, it is not the same thing. Hence while urgency is extrinsic, intensity need not be.

Third and finally, imperative intensities are properly features internal to imperatives — they do not, and need not, track anything in the world. That should not be surprising: the imperativist account, remember, says that pains are primarily spurs to action rather than states which track the world.

Adam Pautz uses this fact to object to the imperative theory. He writes:

> While negative imperatives admit of degree, it is hard to see how their degrees might match up with degrees of painfulness. What in the imperative contents of [an agent’s] two consecutive pains...might determine that the second pain was roughly twice greater than the first? (Pautz (2010) p. 364, fn. 36)\(^5\)

\(^4\)Contrary to what one of the present authors once defended, in (Klein 2012).

\(^5\)Pautz actually raises several objections to imperativism that aren’t relevant to the main point of the paper but are worth mentioning. He notes that that (i) imperativists have not yet presented a theory of pain locations (true, but a topic for another paper), (ii) that imperativism implies that increasing thermal sensations actually change the type...
We think that this is to misunderstand the imperativist position. For all we’ve said, there’s a simple answer to this question: what determines whether one pain is twice greater than another is simply that it is twice as intense. That answer will need some refinement, but in general — the fact that imperatives come in degrees opens the possibility of comparing those degrees.

Of course, pain intensities differ from the intensities of sensations like light and sound. The latter track changes in the magnitude of something in the world. The former don’t. Insofar as judgments about pain intensity are about anything, they are about the pains—and their effects on our motivational state—rather than about the world. But this seems like an attractive feature of our account, not a problem. The intensity of pain roughly tracks intensity of (say) injury — but only very roughly, and often comes apart. Pain from the very same injury may ebb or fall in intensity through the day as we rest, take painkillers, or simply by its own obscure logic. We aren’t inclined to think that the injury has changed, only that the pain has. More generally, it’s always an open question whether changes in the intensity of pain correspond to some change in our injuries; indeed, it is not always clear to us whether our pains correspond to any injury at all. Indeed, there is an extensive empirical literature, in the form of the gate control theory of pain and its successors, devoted to elucidating the mechanisms of this dissociation.

So there is no obvious problem here. There is, however, a subtle problem lurking in the vicinity. Subjects will consistently judge that two pain intensities are ratio multiples of each other in laboratory settings (Price et al. 1983). Whether this means that pain intensity itself is a true magnitude, and so properly measured by a ratio scale, is a more difficult question. The mere fact that subjects can respond to ratio questions and that their response fits a power curve does not itself show that the scale is a ratio scale. For as Hall notes, this is a task “which presupposes that subjects can judge of content they have (true, and here our intuitions simply differ on how strange this is), and (iii) that imperative theories cannot solve certain problems about magnitude of taste, sound, and color experiences (true, but imperativism doesn’t claim that all sensations are imperative; these are among those which aren’t, and so require a different treatment.).

In that sense, it’s even roughly congruent with Pautz’s larger project, which is an attack on ‘tracking externalism’ (Pautz, forthcoming). That includes most representationalist theories of pain but arguably does not include imperativism. For a discussion of Pautz’s more general argument, as well as a general response on behalf of the representationalist which is also partially applicable here, see (Hilbert and Klein, forthcoming).
ratios.” (1981, p. 103). The fact that the resulting judgments fit a power function (especially across the limited range available to ethically acceptable laboratory experiments of pain) may thus show “nothing more than the flexibility of the power function as is evident in its capacity to fit any of the monotonically increasing curves common-sense would expect to describe the relationship between numerical judgments and stimulus intensity.” (p. 104).

Pain intensities, in other words, might be merely orderable, rather than true magnitudes. That would not necessarily prevent people from making judgments about ratios of pains. We think it wise to sidestep this debate. Our goal in the next section, when we model pain intensities, will be only to give a theory that is consistent with subject’s judgments of pain intensities, rather than one which assumes something more controversial about the structure of intensities themselves.

3 Intensity and Content

3.1 Preliminaries

Imperatives vary in intensity; so do pains. A natural conclusion: variations in intensity of pains are due to variations in the intensity or degree of the imperatives that constitute them. That is not quite enough, however. As we’ve emphasized, imperativism is a species of intentionalism. Intentionalism claims that phenomenal content supervenes on the content of experiences. We must therefore show that intensity is part of the content of imperatives.

That is not so obvious. One might hold, for example, that imperative intensity is an extrinsic property (like urgency). That wouldn’t necessarily be fatal to imperativism: one could still claim that pains are imperatives but that their intensity depends on their merely functional (rather than content-bearing) relations to other mental states. That would be a sort of quasi-intentionalism, which might in turn still be amenable to a naturalistic treatment.\footnote{Thanks to Todd Ganson (personal communication) for this suggestion.} Nevertheless, we take it that one of the attractions of imperativism is its ability to link content and consciousness in what have been
traditionally hard cases for the intentionalist, and so it’s worth trying to preserve that feature.

The imperativist must also avoid the appearance of an *ad hoc* solution. One might, for example, treat the content of a pain as simply the ordered pair:

$$\langle W_{sc}, d \rangle$$

where $W_{sc}$ is the set of worlds in which the imperative is satisfied and $d$ is the intensity. That would solve the surface problem neatly. But without saying more, it would be under-motivated. Ideally, the imperativist ought to get the intensity of pain to fall out of a more general theory of imperatives and their structure.

In the remainder of this section, we sketch a model of imperatives on which intensity falls out as a natural, intrinsic part of the content of pains. We use it to explain some puzzling features of pains, and reflect a bit on the naturalization of urgency.

### 3.2 Imperatives and Ranking

Remember that we initially identified the content of an imperative with the set of possible worlds in which the imperative would be satisfied. This can’t be sufficient, however. The command

(O) Raise money for Oxfam!

admits of two readings: one on which you are commanded to raise *any* amount of money, another on which the more money you raise the better. Both imperatives would be satisfied in the same worlds: namely, ones where I raise any amount of money for Oxfam. But the two clearly express different commands. This is because the second *ranks* satisfaction-worlds: the more money I raise, the more preferable the world. Similarly, “Clean your room today!” expresses a different command from “Clean your room today, and the sooner the better!” Both are satisfied in the same worlds. The latter contains an additional exhortation though, which is meant to get you moving faster.
This suggests that the content of an imperative is slightly more expansive: a set of satisfaction worlds plus a ranking function $\succeq$ defined over the set $W$ of all possible worlds. For any two possible worlds $w_i$ and $w_j$, $w_i \succeq w_j$ means that $w_i$ is ranked at least as high as $w_j$. Two worlds are equally ranked if they are ranked at least as high as each other, and a world $w_i$ is ranked strictly better than $w_j$ just in case $w_i$ is ranked at least as high as $w_j$ and they are not equally ranked.

We can thus model the content of an imperative $i$ as the ordered pair

$$\langle W_{sc}, \succeq \rangle$$

For the simplest sorts of imperatives, each world in $W_{sc}$ is ranked strictly better than each world not in $W_{sc}$, each pair of worlds in $W_{sc}$ is equally ranked, and mutis mutandis for worlds not in $W_{sc}$. That is, $\succeq$ partitions $W$ into exactly two equivalence classes: the satisfaction-worlds and the rest, with worlds in the former preferable to to the latter. More complex imperatives partition $W$ into more equivalence classes.

So for example, on the first reading of (O), $\succeq$ will simply define a partition with two equivalence classes: one which includes all and only those worlds in which the addressee of the imperative raises any amount of money for Oxfam, another which includes every other possible world, and such that any world in the former equivalence class is strictly preferable to any world in the latter. On the second reading of (O), $\succeq$ will provide a more complex ranking—the preferable equivalence class will be further partitioned into smaller equivalence classes, each composed by all and only those worlds in which the addressee of the imperative raises a certain amount of money.

This captures the subtle distinction between the two meanings (O). That distinction is grounded in the differences in the $\succeq$ of the two readings, not in the satisfaction-conditions. That suggests that $\succeq$ is part of the content of imperatives, and necessary to make certain distinctions between them.

Given that, two observations are the key to a theory of imperative urgency.

First, note that the $\succeq$ for an imperative $i$ ranks over all possible worlds. This means that it will also include worlds in which other imperatives are satisfied.
Second, note that $\preceq$ is not restricted to ranking worlds in $W_{sc}$ as higher than worlds not in $W_{sc}$. That is, it is possible to have an imperative which ranks the satisfaction of some other imperative as strictly better than its own satisfaction. That may seem odd. But note that it is precisely the case with the formalized structures of imperatives noted in section 2.1. An Autovon call with urgency IMMEDIATE ought to be routed to its destination. Further, it ought to be routed preferably to calls with urgency ROUTINE. So worlds where it is routed and a ROUTINE call is not are ranked as strictly better by $\preceq$ than worlds in which the reverse is the case. And finally, the call ought to be dropped in case of conflict with a call of urgency FLASH. So there are non-satisfaction worlds (in which the call fails in favor of a FLASH call) which are ranked by $\preceq$ as strictly better than satisfaction worlds (i.e. where the call goes through at the expense of the FLASH call).

We propose that this structure is actually definitional of imperative urgency. Let’s say that an imperative $i$ is satisfied at the expense of some imperative $k$ just in case either $i$ is satisfied and $k$ is not or $i$ is satisfied temporally prior to $k$ being satisfied. Say that an imperative $i$ is semi-preferable to an imperative $j$ relative to some imperative $k$ just in case either:

1. $i$ ranks all worlds in which it is satisfied at the expense of $k$ as better than worlds in which $k$ is satisfied at the expense of $i$ and (2) $j$ does not rank all worlds in which it is satisfied at the expense of $k$ as better than worlds in which $k$ is satisfied at the expense of $j$.

   or

2. $i$ ranks some worlds in which it is satisfied at the expense of $k$ as not worse than worlds in which $k$ is satisfied at the expense of $i$ and (2) $j$ ranks all worlds in which it is satisfied at the expense of $k$ as worse than worlds in which $k$ is satisfied at the expense of $j$.

Given this, we can define imperative urgency as follows:

**Urgency** An imperative $i$ is more urgent than an imperative $j$ just in case there is some imperative relative to which $i$ is semi-preferable to $j$ and no imperative relative to which $j$ is semi-preferable to $i$.

---

8Note that $k$ might be a merely hypothetical imperative for the purposes of ranking, not one than an agent actually entertains or is bound by.
Let’s unpack that a bit. The simplest cases—and by far the most common—will be ones in which $i$ ranks its own satisfaction as better than $j$’s, and $j$ agrees. How do we know which of two Autovon phone calls is more urgent? Well, a Flash call $i$ ranks its own connection as better than some Routine call $j$, and $j$ also ranks its completion as less important than the completion of $i$. So $i$ is semi-preferable to $j$. As that structure is consistent across the different Autovon levels, $j$ is never semi-preferable to $i$. Hence $i$ is more urgent than $j$. Note here that when sorting out semi-preferability, the third imperative $k$ can simply be $j$ itself.

The third imperative $k$, and the indirect structure it makes possible, are necessary for a tricky subset of cases (ones, however, that pains arguably exemplify). Consider the imperative “Repent your sins, and the sooner the better!” It seems possible that the pastor and the prophet might issue these commands in a way that varies in urgency—the prophet utters it as a matter of gravest importance, while the pastor is more understanding of the complexities of modern life. Yet the two imperatives have the same satisfaction conditions $W_{sc}$. Further, they always rank earlier satisfaction as ceteris paribus better than later satisfaction. So it’s not obvious how to drive a wedge between the two. Note that this problem appears whenever we have two imperatives with the same $W_{sc}$: it’s not possible to construct worlds in one but not the other is satisfied, or where one is satisfied earlier than the other, and so it’s hard to see how they might be ranked.

Here, however, we can still construct semi-preferability by reference to other things one might do. Consider some third imperative $k$—say, to move your car out of the fire lane. The prophet cares not for fire lanes; $i_{prophet}$ ranks repentance higher than satisfying $k$. The pastor understands the importance of rendering unto Caesar and all that. So $i_{pastor}$ might rank satisfying $k$ as more important than repentance. (Note that the ranking stipulated by $k$ is irrelevant: it is only the ranking of various forms of $i$ relative to the satisfaction of $k$ that is at issue.) This is consistent with the stipulation that the pastor wants you to repent sooner rather than later, so long as that is read with an appropriate ceteris paribus clause. For it is true that, everything else being kept fixed, earlier repentance will be better than later. If so, then $i_{prophet}$ is semi-preferable to $i_{pastor}$. Assuming that this structure holds generally, then the prophet’s imperative is more urgent than the pastor’s, even though both are satisfied in exactly the same conditions. Hence for very similar or identically-satisfied imperatives, their urgency can still
be compared by triangulating against other possible things you might do.

This approach to imperative urgency has several advantages. Most happily, imperative urgency ends up depending on content. Furthermore, it does so by depending on content in a principled way: the inclusion of $\succeq$ is necessary to capture the differences between the readings of imperatives like (O). Second, we have done so using a purely ordinal measure, $\succeq$, which leaves open the possibility that the extension to pains might treat pain intensities as merely ordered, rather than as a real-valued quantity.

The theory on offer also explains why imperative urgency makes the most sense in limited domains—or, conversely, why many imperatives have incommensurate urgencies. If I utter (O) and your department head orders you to repaint your office, there may not be a well-defined sense in which one of those commands is more urgent than the other. That falls out nicely from our theory. The two imperatives are mutually selfish: each ranks its own satisfaction-worlds higher than worlds in which it fails to be satisfied and the others are. So neither is semi-preferable to the other. Many simple imperatives might be like this, which partially explains why imperative urgency has received so little treatment in the literature. It’s also possible for two imperatives to be incommensurate because each is semi-preferable to the other with respect to different third imperatives. Such cases may play a more interesting role in action deliberation when the third imperative is not merely hypothetical but also one that the agent must try to satisfy.

Of course, one must decide which imperative ought to take priority in your actions. Priority, as we established previously, may depend in part on facts extrinsic to the imperative—your other plans and desires, the source of the commands, and so on. So priority can be sorted out even in cases where urgencies are incommensurate. However, when two imperatives are commensurate, then the more urgent one ought to be (all things considered) satisfied before, and in preference to, the less urgent one.

Finally, the present theory can account for cases where urgencies appear to have a cardinal structure. Suppose $\gtrsim$ has relatively fine-grained rankings over worlds, such that (for example) it distinguishes worlds where you satisfy $i$ and forgo one unit of some good from worlds where you satisfy $i$ and forgo two units of some good. Suppose further we can identify points of indifference where satisfying $i$ is as good as some quantity of $x$, better than
any lesser quantity, and worse than any greater quantity. Given this, suppose we have two imperatives $i$ and $j$ each of which have this structure relative to the $x$s, and further that $i$ ranks its satisfaction as on a par with $n$ units of $x$ while $j$ ranks itself as on a par with $2n$ such units. Under such circumstances, we can say that $j$ is not just more urgent but *twice as urgent as $i$*. One would, of course, need such a structure to be in place consistently—but if it were, it would be natural to speak of ratios of urgencies, not simply ordinal comparisons between them. Note here that the relevant ratio measure has no relation whatsoever to properties, but only to the rankings of different satisfaction and non-satisfaction worlds by the imperative. Hence we can have complex differences in the urgency of an imperative without having to find a sense in which that imperative somehow tracks a magnitude in the world.

### 3.3 The Intensity of Pain

The extension to pain is straightforward. Pains are imperatives. As part of their content, they have an especially rich and complex $\succ$, one rich enough to make the sorts of comparisons noted above. So, for example, one pain is more intense than another just in case their world-rankings agree that one should tend to the body part involved in the first pain at the expense of the one in the second. Differences in intensity of pains in the same body part can be cashed out (for example) in terms of standard gambles against other valued goods.

This structure explains differences in intensities of pain. It also allows plenty of flexibility to account for oddities of cross-modal judgments of intensity. I can judge the intensity of my pain and my hunger; further, I can judge that my hunger is more intense than my pain. It is not clear to us, however, whether we’re ever in a position to judge that some hunger is *twice as intense* as a pain. If that is a puzzling sort of claim, the phenomenon can be captured

---

9Or more precisely, under conditions where both rankings satisfy the axioms of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem. If so, then the theorem would ensure that we could find a suitable cardinal function that described an agent’s behavior, and that would in turn be enough to account for ratio judgments of intensity as well as standard bets over merely likely satisfactions of $i$. If you don’t like the arbitrary good $x$, you might also construct a cardinal function out of those standard bets. Note that this is consistent with, but does not imply, the presence of an actual real-valued magnitude which gives rise to $\succ$ (Ellsberg 1954).
by our account: it will occur if $\succeq$ has the requisite structure to make ratio judgments only within modalities, while between-modality imperatives have enough structure to $\succeq$ to allow ordinal but not ratio judgments. This would be the case if, for example, a set of imperatives had a structure like the following (where $\sim$ indicates ‘is ranked equally with’).

$$
\begin{align*}
\succeq_1 & \text{ I don’t have pain}_1 \sim [\text{I have pain}_1 \text{ and } 2n \text{ units of } x] > \text{I don’t have pain}_2 \sim [\text{I have pain}_2 \text{ and } n \text{ units of } x] > \text{I don’t have hunger}_1 > \text{I don’t have hunger}_2 \\
\succeq_2 & \text{I don’t have pain}_1 > \text{I don’t have pain}_2 > \text{I don’t have hunger}_1 \sim [\text{I have hunger}_1 \text{ and } 2n \text{ units of } y] > \text{I don’t have hunger}_2 \sim [\text{I have hunger}_2 \text{ and } n \text{ units of } y]
\end{align*}
$$

That is, both rankings place pain only as more urgent than hunger, but each of them has richer structure within just one modality. Hence cross-modality comparisons are merely ordinal, but intra-modality ones can be cardinal.

Further elaborations of the model could account for other pain phenomena. Here is one intriguing possibility. Merely ordinal rankings—even ones that can be used to derive cardinal ranking functions—are not easily aggregated. Even if, say, the pain in my feet is more urgent than both my hunger and my thirst, it’s not obvious whether I should stop hiking or continue on given that I am both hungry and thirsty. Models of aggregation do exist, however. In those models, different ordinal rankings receive weightings which determine how much they matter to the final aggregate.$^{10}$ In the context of pain, those weights might be interpreted as marking individual differences in the importance of pain: individuals which tend to assign low weights to pains will, all things consider, discount even relatively intense pains. Hence we might also have a model for individual differences in imperative urgency, one which would further distinguish between different imperative modalities.

Finally—since it can’t be emphasized enough—these differences in the urgency of pain depend entirely on the contents of the imperatives that constitute pain. Hence imperativism remains consistent with intentionalism.

$^{10}$So, for example, one might use the weighted Kendall-tau distance. The Kendall-tau distance is a measure of how often reversals occur between pairs of ordinal rankings. Aggregated rankings which minimize the weighted Kendall-tau distance have a number of intuitively appealing properties. See Ailon, Charikar, and Newman 2008 for a discussion and review of other ranking methods.
3.4 The Naturalization of Intensity

A few final thoughts on the naturalization of imperative urgency to conclude. One might worry that the contents so proposed are unusually florid, particularly the complexities of the ranking function. Note, however, that this is no argument against a model of content itself. One should no more balk at the complexity of the ranking function than at the use of sets of possible worlds. We have not committed ourselves to a story about how the content of imperatives is implemented, but we see no reason why that story faces any principled problems—why the above, for example, could not be cashed out in an approximate sense at least by patterns and frequencies of neural firings.

That said, imperativism is attractive in part because it promises a full naturalization of pain. We conclude, therefore, with two brief reflections on how thinking of pains as imperatives might be especially useful. First, one might look to work on imperatives in natural language, particularly on how the contents of imperatives function in conversational contexts is fixed. In this regard we have found particularly illuminating Paul Portner’s work on imperatives. According to Portner, when someone utters an imperative in a conversation, it adds an item to the To-do list of the addressee. So, for example, telling me to pass the salt has the effect of appending the property of being such that I pass the salt to my To-do list (2007). The To-do list functions as an action-oriented version of Stalnaker’s Common Ground. It can be affected by other imperatives, as well as by background desires and goals of the participants. A similar model, we believe, might prove fruitful when exploring the effect of pains on the overall mental economy.

Second, imperativism fits naturally with a teleosemantic account of mental content (Millikan 1984; Martínez 2010). The main contention of this kind of approach is that the content of mental states depends on their biological function, or that of appropriately related states. Cashing out that biological function requires a story about the consumers of imperative contents. Here again, the imperative view has much to say. Some regions in the motor cortex, for example, are likely consumers for painful mental states. Urgencies here play an important role: we first note that a mental mechanism can advocate for the spending of more or less resources in certain behaviors. Take, for example, physiological responses (increasing heart rate, avoidance) in the face of danger: dangers that are assessed as less immediate provoke a
lesser response that more urgent problems. A well-adapted biological agent thus needs both information about what to do and about how urgently it ought to be done. Our account of imperative content provides a nice framework within which to cash out that idea.

4 Conclusion

The semantics of imperatives which differ in urgency is not a topic that has received as much attention as others in the study of imperatives (let alone indicatives). Our discussion of imperative urgency, and the formal apparatus we have used to frame it, is proposed in the spirit of a preliminary exploration. In that spirit, we’ve shown that imperativism has no insurmountable problems dealing with varying degrees of urgency.
References


